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COMING TO GRIPS WITH SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
IN DAUBERTS "BRAVE NEW WORLD": THE
COURTS' NEED TO APPRECIATE THE
EVIDENTIARY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN VALIDITY
AND PROFICIENCY STUDIES'
Edward J. Imwinkelriet
"'If the law supposes that,' said Mr. Bumble... 'the law is a
ass, a idiot.'"
-Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist
INTRODUCTION
For decades, the courts have regarded scientific testimony
with suspicion. Their fear was that jurors would uncritically
accept such testimony at face value and assign it undue
weight. In one case, the California Supreme Court voiced the
fear that science is "a veritable sorcerer in our computerized
society," a sorcerer who can "cast a spell" over the trier of
fact.' In another decision, the same court expressed concern
about the "misleading aura of certainty which often envelops a
new scientific process." For its part, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals asserted that jurors often attribute a "mystic
infallibility" to scientific evidence.3 In a similar vein, the
Maryland Court of Appeals has stated that jurors routinely
overestimate the probative worth and certainty of scientific
testimony.4 For that matter, several courts have declared that
it is doubtful that even legally trained judges are competent to
* @1995 Edward J. inwinkelried. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Law, University of Califrnia at Davis; former chair, Evidence
Section, American Association of Law Schools. Professor Imwinlelried consulted
with the plaintiffs in preparing their briefs before the United States Supreme
Court in the Daubert case.
1 People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968).
' People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976).
'United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C.Cir. 1974).
• Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (td. 1978).
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pass on essentially scientific questions; in their view, scientists
are far better "qualified to assess the general validity of a
scientific method."5
Given these assumptions, it was perhaps to be expected
that the courts would turn to the traditional, general
acceptance test as the standard determining the admissibility
of scientific evidence. 6 Under this standard-sometimes
dubbed the Frye test after the 1923 case announcing the
standard-a scientific theory or technique may not serve as a
basis for testimony until the theory or technique has gained
general acceptance among the members of the relevant
scientific field or specialty.8 Given courts' fears, the Frye test
had two obvious virtues. First, the test is "essentially
conservative,"9 striking a note of 'judicial caution." Again, the
courts assumed that lay jurors ascribe excessive weight to
scientific testimony and naively expect it to be virtually
infallible." The general-acceptance test helped to ensure that
the only testimony admitted would be testimony measuring up
to that expectation.
Second, in applying the test, the trial judge does not have
to reach the merits of the scientific dispute. Under Frye, judges
"could avoid coming to grips with science."" The test focuses
on an indirect indicator of scientific validity," namely, the
popularity of the theory or technique in the specialty field. The
existence of a certain degree of popularity is the type of
historical, nontechnical issue which judges are accustomed to
deciding. General acceptance serves as a surrogate 3 for a
direct evaluation of the scientific research underpinning the
theory or technique. The test not only permits the trial judge
6 E.g., Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1244-45.
1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§
1-5 (2d ed. 1993).
7 Id.
S Id.
People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Cal. 1976).
0Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A
Critique from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554, 562
(1983).
U Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New
Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L.REV. 715, 718 (1994).
12 RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES: CASES, MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS 289 (3d ed. 1991).
' Black et al., supra note 11, at 721, 725.
1248 [Vol. 61:1247
DAUBERVS BRAVE NEW WORLD
to "hid[e] from science;"14 but it also in effect delegates the
decision on admissibility to the scientific community.'
At one time, the Frye test was controlling in forty-five
states and in all the federal circuits. 6 In 1993, however, the
United States Supreme Court jettisoned Frye. In that year, the
Court handed down its decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' Mr. Justice Blackmun authored the
majority opinion. The majority initially ruled that the general-
acceptance test is no longer good law in federal court. Justice
Blackmun pointed out that under Federal Rule of Evidence
402, logically relevant evidence is "admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by
Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.""8
Although the exceptive language in Rule 402 lists the
Constitution, statutes, the Federal Evidence Rules, and rules
such as the Rules of Civil Procedure "prescribed by statutory
authority," Rule 402 makes no mention of case or decisional
law. In the past, the Court had held that Rule 402 has the
effect of abolishing uncodified exclusionary rules of evidence. 9
Adhering to that holding, Justice Blackmun reasoned that the
enactment of the Federal Rules implicitly overturned the Frye
test; although the test enjoyed widespread support at common
law, the majority stated that there was no language in the text
of the Federal Rules which could reasonably bear the
interpretation that it codified a general-acceptance standard.
The general-acceptance test is a creature of case law.
The majority next ruled that the statutory language of
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 supplies a new, empirical
1' Black et al., supra note 11, at 722.
People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Cal. 1976).
Betty R. Steingass, Changing the Standard for the Admissibility of
Novel/Scientific Evidence: State v. Wiams, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 757, 769 (1979).
17 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
ia FED. . EVID. 402.
See generally Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of
Evidence After Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning' Jurisprudenee, the
Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidcnce, and Suggestions for
Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 857 (1992); Randolph N.
Jonakait, The Supreme Court. Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence,
68 TEX. L. REv. 745 (1990); Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the
Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO Sr. L.J. 1307 (1992).
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validation test to replace Frye. Rule 702 reads, "If scientific...
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise."' According to Rule 702, the witness's possession
of "scientific ... knowledge" is what qualifies the witness as an
expert; and the witness must testify "thereto." Parsing the
language of Rule 702, Justice Blackmun concluded that the
rule requires the substance of the expert's testimony to qualify
as "scientific ... knowledge."
The question then became defining that term. According to
Justice Blackmun, that term does not equate with a particular
body of substantive propositions. Rather, it denotes a proposi-
tion "derived by the scientific method."' The justice described
that method as the process of formulating hypotheses and
empirically falsifying or validating the hypotheses.' A theory
or technique constitutes "scientific... knowledge" within the
intendment of Rule 702 if it rests on sound scientific methodol-
ogy. When testimony satisfies this empirical validation test,
the testimony is admissible even if the witness's conclusion is
novel and controversial.' By opening the door to the intro-
duction of testimony about novel scientific theories and tech-
niques, the United States Supreme Court liberalized the stan-
dard for introducing scientific testimony.
In contrast, the California Supreme Court has long been
considered a bastion of the traditional, general-acceptance test.
The California Supreme Court adopted the test in 1976.4 The
court emphasized that the "conservative nature" of the test
was its "primary advantage." The court favored the Frye test
because that test "assigned the task of determining reliability
of the evolving technique to the members of the scientific com-
munity from which the new method emerges."26 In 1994, the
21 FED. R. EVID. 702.
2 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
2 Id. at 2795-96.
' Edward J. Imwinkeh-ied, The Daubert Decision: Frye Is Dead, Long Live the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 29 TRIAL 60, 64 (Sept. 1993).
Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240.
2 Id. at 1244.
21 Id.
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court reaffirmed its commitment to the general-acceptance test
in People v. LeahyY The court adamantly refused to embrace
the Daubert test.
While Leahy ruled that the controlling standard in Califor-
nia state court is still the general-acceptance test, the court
modified-and arguably liberalized-the test in an important
respect. The court acknowledged that some critics of the Frye
test have charged that the test reduces the trial judge's deter-
mination to a crude 'nose count.' The court made it clear,
however, that it did not want trial judges to administer the
test in that fashion. Rather, the court declared that "trial
courts, in determining the general acceptance issue, must con-
sider the quality, as well as quantity, of the evidence support-
ing or opposing a new scientific technique. Mere numerical
majority support or opposition by persons minimally qualified
to state an authoritative opinion is of little value.' The court
instructed trial judges to attach greater weight to the views of
the "major voices" in the specialty field.'0
Prior to Leahy, several intermediate appellate courts in
California had ruled DNA testimony inadmissible." However,
seizing upon the language in Leahy, several lower California
courts already have ruled that DNA evidence is now admissi-
ble in that jurisdiction. 2 (Those rulings might well have influ-
enced the Simpson defense team's decision to stipulate initially
to the admission of the DNA test results in that case.) As a
practical matter, Leahy has relaxed the admissibility standard
in California. The lower courts are reading Leahy as a signal
that they are free to admit testimony about a scientific theory
or technique even in the face of numerically substantial opposi-
tion to that theory or technique-so long as the opponents can
be characterized as mavericks rather than "major voices" in
2' 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994).
8 Id. at 330.
2 Id. at 336-37.
'Id.
E.g., People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
People v. Taylor, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); People v.
Marlow, 39 Cal. App. 4th 343, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2cd 5 (Cal. C. App.), superseded by
grant of review, 899 P.2d 65 (CaL 1995); People v. Wilds, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351
(Cal. Ct. App.), superseded by grant of review, 890 P.2d 1115 (Cal. 1995); People v.
Soto, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), superseded by grant of review, 890
P.2d 1115 (Cal. 1995).
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the mainstream of the discipline.
In the words of Judge Alex Kozinski, decisions such as
Daubert propel the legal system into a brave new world.'
Daubert certainly thrusts trial judges into a new world. Justice
Blackmun's opinion directs trial judges to eschew surrogates
and apply scientific standards in determining the admissibility
of proffered expert testimony.' In deciding whether to admit
the testimony, trial judges must use the same standards scien-
tists employ in evaluating the empirical validation of the un-
derlying theory or technique.' If the expert's hypothesis does
not lend itself to empirical testing, a scientist would not accept
the hypothesis, and under Daubert, neither should a trial judge
permit the introduction of testimony about the hypothesis.36
Similarly, when the expert has not gone to the length of engag-
ing in experimentation or observation to test the hypothesis, a
scientist would not regard the hypothesis as validated; and a
trial judge should refuse to allow testimony about the hypothe-
sis to be submitted to the jury.37 Shortly after the rendition of
the Daubert decision, the Federal Judicial Center released the
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence.' The manual's
chapters review the rudiments of such scientific specialties as
DNA testing,39  epidemiology,0  statistical analysis,4  and
toxicology. As the Introduction written by Judge William W.
Schwarzer explains, the Center concluded that trial judges
needed such a manual because the Daubert "standard demands
an understanding by judges of the principles and methods that
underlie scientific studies.4 3
Like judges, jurors are being thrust into Judge Alex
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 189 (1995).
u Bert Black, The Supreme Court's View of Science: Has Daubert Exorcised the
Certainty Demon?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2129 (1994).
Black, supra note 34, at 2131.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796-97
(1993).
37 Id.
'8 FED. JUD. CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994) (herein.
after "REFERENCE MANUAL").
" Id. at 273.
40 Id. at 121.
4' Id. at 331.
42 Id. at 181.
43 REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 38, at 2.
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Kozinski's brave new world.4 By liberalizing admissibility
standards, decisions such as Daubert and Leahy shift the focus
to the question of the weight of the scientific testimony.' To
attack the weight of scientific testimony, the opponent can
proffer studies documenting weaknesses in the underlying
technique 6 or the analyst's incompetence in applying the
technique.' In its highly publicized 1992 report on DNA evi-
dence, the National Research Council ("N.R.C.") urged that
proficiency studies of DNA laboratories be conducted48 and
that laboratory error rates be disclosed to the jury 9 Citing
the N.R.C. report, the Simpson defense team argued that the
jurors in that case should be informed of the studies
"estimat[ing] frequency of laboratory errors that might cause a
false match between samples from different people.' °
It is evident that in the future, scientific research studies
can play an important role in both judges' admissibility deci-
sions and jurors' determinations of the weight of scientific
testimony. However, two other things have become painfully
clear in the past few years. First, most judges and attorneys do
not appreciate the distinctions among the various types of
scientific studies. Second, and worse still, they do not yet real-
ize that there are differing evidentiary hurdles to the introduc-
tion of the various types of studies.
Numerous types of scientific research studies can become
relevant at trial.5' Unfortunately no universally accepted ter-
"Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 189 (1995).
1 Edward J.. Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evi-
dence-A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WI. & MARY
L. REV. 261 (1981).
0EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATrACKING SCIENTIFIC EVI-
DENCE § 10-6 (2a ed. 1992).
Id. at Cl. 12.
CoM. ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, N'L RESEARCH COUN-
CIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE S-14, S-15, 2-5, 3-23 (1992).
Id. at 3-17, 3-25.
Notice of Objections to Testimony Concerning DNA Evidence and Memoran-
dum in Support Thereof, People v. Simpson, Case No. BA 097211, 1995 VWL
126286 at *9 (Super. Ct., L.A. County, March 20, 1995).
51 The terminology for describing the various types of studies is not particular-
ly well settled. See Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56
FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 599, 612 (1988). However, one leading commentator, Profes-
sor Paul C. Giannell, states:
Although courts use the term "validity" and 'reliability' interchangeably,
1995]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
minology describes the various types of studies.52 Consequent-
ly, we must heed Voltaire's imperative and first "define [our]
terms."' In particular, we need to define a validity study and
a proficiency study for purposes of this Article.
A validity study is designed to measure the accuracy of a
scientific technique.' The study attempts to identify and
quantify the inherent margin of error in the technique;55 the
researcher inquires how often the technique will yield inaccu-
rate results even when the analyst strictly follows proper test
procedure. By way of example, suppose that the hypothesis is
that a new type of breathalyzer validly measures a person's
blood alcohol concentration ("BAC"). The researcher could test
that hypothesis by using the instrument to gauge the BAC of a
number of persons who had consumed alcohol and comparing
the terms have distinct meanings in scientific jargon. "Validity" refers to
the ability of a test procedure to measure what it is supposed to mea-
sure-its accuracy. "Reliability" refers to whether the same results are
obtained in each instance in which the test is performed-its consistency.
Validity includes reliability, but the converse is not necessarily true.
Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1201 n. 20 (1980). As Pro-
fessor Giannelli uses the term "reliability," a reliability study is designed to assess
consistency. If the objective were to measure a particular analyst's consistency, the
study would require the analyst to repeat essentially identical forensic tasks, and
the researcher would gauge the probability that the analyst would reach the same
findings. If the objective were to measure interanalyst consistency, the study would
require different analysts to perform the same forensic tasks, and the researcher
would measure the probability that the various analysts would reach the same
findings. An interanalyst reliability study could be highly relevant in a professional
negligence action. Assume, for instance, that the plaintiff filed an action against a
laboratory for alleged negligence in conducting a test. The plaintiff introduces the
testimony of an analyst from another laboratory who retested the sample and ar-
rived at diametrically opposed findings. The defending laboratory might even con-
cede that its test outcome was in error but argue that they were nevertheless not
guilty of negligence. To support their argument, they might proffer an interanalyst
reliability study indicating that even the state-of-the-art scientific technique which
they used can produce inconsistent results in the hands of equally well-qualified,
meticulous analysts.
I' Black, supra note 51, at 599, 612; James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States
Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26
JURIMETRICS 249, 255-58 (1986).
r3 Quoted in THE HOME BOOK OF QUOTATIONS: CLASSICAL AND MODERN 428
(10th ed. 1967).
Giannelli, supra note 51.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of
Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 577, 601 (1984).
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the instrument's readouts with direct blood tests of the same
persons. Since direct blood testing has already been estab-
lished as a valid method of measuring BAG s a coincidence
between the readings and the direct blood test results would
tend to verify the hypothesis. However, the readings might
disagree with the direct blood alcohol test results to an extent.
The degree of disagreement would indicate how frequently the
new technique yields inaccurate results" even when the ana-
lyst follows correct test procedures.
A proficiency study is radically different. While a validity
study tests a scientific technique, in a proficiency study the
object of the test is a particular analyst or laboratory. The
validity test is designed to ensure to the extent possible that
correct test procedures are used; in a validity test, the re-
searchers attempt to eliminate any concern about the use of a
proper test procedure because they want to reach the central
question of how often the scientific technique itself will pro-
duce inaccurate results despite proper test protocol. In con-
trast, a proficiency study endeavors to measure the analyst's
proficiency in the sense of the probability that he or she will
consistently use proper test procedure. Assuming the validity
of the technique, the researcher inquires into the probability
that while using the technique, the analyst will "mistakenly
use[ the wrong materials [or] ma[kie the wrong measure-
ment.... ." Even when the analyst is utilizing a valid tech-
nique, the analyst might commit a "performance-type er-
ror[].
The thesis of this Article is that validity and proficiency
studies differ both in their scientific nature and their eviden-
tiary admissibility. The post-Daubert commentary has general-
ly recognized that judges and juries must now learn to come to
grips with scientific studies.'0 The commentary has over-
looked, however, both the distinction between these types of
studies and the evidentiary issues which they pose. The NRC's
report urged the admission of testimony about proficiency
w2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, at
§ 22-3(B), at 205-07 (2d ed. 1993).
Black, supra note 51, at 637-38.
Black, et al, supra note 11, at 775.
Black, et al., supra note 11, at 775.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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studies without a glimmer of recognition that there might be
serious evidentiary hurdles to the admission of the testimo-
ny.6 For that matter, in the Simpson case, testimony about
proficiency studies was elicited without objection. The implicit
assumption seems to be that these studies are so highly proba-
tive in Daubert's brave new world that to paraphrase Mr.
Bumble, it would be asinine and idiotic to bar testimony about
such studies.
On closer scrutiny, though, it develops that there are sub-
stantial, potential evidentiary objections to be made. Part I of
this Article is devoted to validity studies. After describing the
nature of validity studies, this Part discusses the application of
the hearsay rule and the character evidence prohibition to the
introduction of testimony about such studies. This Part con-
cludes that although the character evidence prohibition should
not bar the introduction of the testimony, in many cases the
hearsay rule will have precisely that effect. Part II turns to
proficiency studies. As in the case of validity studies, this Part
initially describes the essential methodology of proficiency
studies. Part H then analyzes their admissibility in terms of
the same exclusionary rules discussed in Part I, namely, hear-
say and character. This Part demonstrates that in an eviden-
tiary sense, proficiency studies are the mirror image of validity
studies; although the hearsay rule will rarely block the admis-
sion of testimony about a proficiency study, in some instances
the character-evidence prohibition will prove to be an insupera-
ble barrier to admission. Again, there appears to be consensus
that judges and juries need the benefit of these studies to cope
with scientific evidence in Daubert's brave new world. The
Conclusion therefore calls for revising the hearsay and charac-
ter doctrines.
I. VALIDITY STUDIES
A. The Scientific Nature of a Validity Study
As noted above, no universally accepted terms of art de-
scribe the various types of scientific studies." For that mat-
61 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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ter, a particular scientific research project can be designed to
pursue several different objectives. As the terminology is em-
ployed in this Article, however, in a validity study, the
researchers' objective is to assess the accuracy of a scientific
technique.' If properly used, does the technique accurately
measure "what it is supposed to measure"?
What is the logical relevance of a validity study at trial?
To answer that question, we must consider the typical struc-
ture of a scientist's direct examination. In most cases, the
structure is syllogistic.' Consider, for example, a case such as
the Simpson prosecution in which the government offers DNA
evidence. After qualifying an expert in molecular biology, the
direct examiner usually organizes the balance of the scientist's
testimony along the lines of a syllogism. The expert's major
premise would be that when the DNA fragments on two
autoradiograms are of the same length and in the same posi-
tion, the match indicates that the sources of the two samples
share certain DNA markers.' The expert's minor premise is
the case-specific information. When the scientific testimony is
a DNA analysis, the minor premise would be testimony about
the two autoradiograms in the case. When the expert applies
the major premise to the minor, the result is a conclusion, an
opinion relevant to material facts of consequence in the pend-
ing case. If the DNA bands on the two autorads matched, the
expert would opine that the sources of the two samples had at
least those DNA markers in common.
This syllogistic model holds true for "soft" mental-health
testimony as well as "hard" instrumental scientific techniques
such as DNA analysis. Assume, for instance, that a psychia-
trist contemplated testifying that a particular individual was
mentally incompetent. After testifying to her credentials, the
Giannell, supra note 51. See also Annot. Daniel A. Klein, Reliability of Sci-
entific Technique and Its Acceptance Within Scientific Community, as Affecting Ad-
missibility, at Federal Trial, of Expert Testimony as to Result of Test or Study
Based on Such Technique-Modern Cases, 105 A.LR. FED. 299, 319 (1991) (ex-
periments to verify the accuracy of [the] technique").
"Giannelli, supra note 51.
" Edward J. Imwinkehied, The Educational Significance of the Syllogistic
Structure of Expert Testimony, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1148 (1993); Edward J.
Imwinkehried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scien-
tific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1988).
r 2 GIANNELu & Ih KELRIED, supra note 56, at 1-39.
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expert would state her major premise. The premise would be a
theory about symptomatology: If a person displays symptoms A
and B, they suffer from mental illness C. The minor premise
would be case-specific information about the symptoms dis-
played by the individual in question. The expert might rely on
reports from a treating physician and family members. When
the expert applies the major premise to the minor, again the
application will yield a conclusion or opinion relevant to the
competency dispute.
This model enables us to identify the logical relevance of a
validity study. The study relates directly to the scientist's ma-
jor premise. In the case of DNA analysis, the hypothesis is that
when the DNA fragments on two autoradiograms match, the
match indicates identical DNA markers. A validity investiga-
tion of that hypothesis would attempt to establish the probabil-
ity that matching fragments accurately indicate matching DNA
markers. In the case of mental-health testimony, the hypothe-
sis is that the presence of symptoms A and B in the patient's
case history indicates that the patient suffers from mental
illness C. In a validity study of that hypothesis, the researcher
would endeavor to identify the probability that the concurrence
of symptoms A and B accurately predicts the existence of men-
tal disorder C.
When the focus is on the expert's major premise, neither
the expert's proponent nor the opponent should be limited to
validity studies personally conducted by the testifying expert.
In this context, the issue is the validity of the theory, not the
competence of the testifying expert. Even if the expert is com-
petent, the theory or technique can suffer from an inherent
margin of error. To assess the validity of the technique used by
the testifying expert, it would also be pertinent to consider
studies conducted by other scientists. In the scientific tradi-
tion, after conducting a validity study, the scientist publishes
his or her findings to enable other scientists to replicate the
experiment.67 Indeed, in many cases, the testifying expert per-
sonally has not conducted any validity study; rather, he or she
" ERNESr E. SNYDER, HISTORY OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES 38-39 (1969); Andre
A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-an Alternative to the Frye Rule,
25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 545, 556 (1984); James W. Osterburg, The Scientific
Method and Criminal Investigation, 9 J. POL. SCI. ADMIN. 135 (1981).
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is simply relying on earlier studies-studies which are perhaps
decades old-that validate the hypothesis upon which he or
she is relying. The question is the validity of the theory or
technique; and whether the study is conducted by the testi-
fying expert or a third party, a validity study sheds light on
that question. In this respect, a validity study differs funda-
mentally from a proficiency study. The whole point of the lat-
ter study is to assess the competence of a particular analyst or
laboratory; the performance of another analyst or laboratory
under even the same conditions does not answer the question
of how proficient this analyst or laboratory is.
The two types of studies differ in a further respect. In a
validity study, the researcher is comparing the results of prop-
erly using the proposed technique with the results yielded by
properly using an already validated methodology. Suppose, for
example, that the question is the validity of a new drug identi-
fication technique.' The researcher would employ the new
technique to test a number of samples and then compare those
test results with results generated by an established methodol-
ogy such as gas chromatography/mass spectrometry
("GC/MS). 69 GC/MS is the "gold standard" in drug identifica-
tion technology 0 In a validity test, the essential terms of the
comparison are the results yielded by proper use of the new
technique with the results generated by using a proven tech-
nique. In contrast, a proficiency test involves a different com-
parison. Now the question is the probability that a particular
analyst or laboratory uses a particular technique properly. To
do so, the researcher compares test results generated by a
laboratory correctly using the procedure with results reported
by the laboratory whose proficiency is being investigated.
The two types of studies differ in still another respect. If
the researcher administers a series of proficiency tests to the
same analyst or laboratory to chart their proficiency over time,
on each occasion the test conditions should be identical. Other-
wise, the researcher is comparing apples and oranges. In con-
trast, although all the validity studies testing a particular
2 GIANNELLI & IMINKELEIED, supra note 56, at 271.339.
2 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 56, at 313-19.
' David J. Greenblatt, Urine Drug Testing. What Does it Test?, 23 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 651, 655 (1988-89).
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scientific technique will control for the same basic variables,
the test conditions can and should vary. More specifically, as
the validity studies progress, test conditions should become
more and more severe." "The more severe and more diverse
the experiments that fail to falsify an... hypothesis, the more
corroborated... it becomes.' 2 Hence, a pertinent validity
study might not only have been performed by a third party
other than the testifying witness; the study might also have
been conducted under somewhat different test conditions. 3
B. The Evidentiary Status of a Validity Study
The expert's major premise is obviously an essential com-
ponent of his or her reasoning process. If so, the litigants on
both sides might have occasion to proffer testimony about a
validity study to the judge or jury. Do the technical
exclusionary rules of evidence such as hearsay and character
apply at this juncture in the trial? If so, can the litigants over-
come hearsay and character objections to the introduction of
testimony about validity studies?
1. The Applicability of Exclusionary Rules of Evidence
At this point, a reader familiar with the Federal Rules of
Evidence might wonder whether this question is much ado
about nothing. After all, the last sentence of Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(a), governing the trial judge's determination of
most foundational or preliminary facts, reads: "In making its
determination [the court] is not bound by the rules of evidence
except those with respect to privileges.' 4 The courts have
squarely held that this language renders exclusionary rules
such as hearsay inapplicable to foundational testimony. 5
Although Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) does contain
that provision, that provision does not reduce this question to a
non-issue. To begin with, many jurisdictions do not follow the
' Black et al., supra note 11, at 762-63.
72 Black et al., supra note 11, at 783.
Black et al., supra note 11, at 762-63, 784.
71 FED. R. EVID. 104.
"' State v. Cardone, 368 A.2d 952, 954-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976),
cert. denied, 379 A.2d 234 (N.J. 1977).
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rule stated in the last sentence of Rule 104(a). In these juris-
dictions, the exclusionary rules apply even to foundational
testimony submitted to the judge when the judge makes ad-
missibility determinations outside the jury's presence. 6 Fur-
thermore, even when a jurisdiction follows the practice codified
in the last sentence of Rule 104(a), that sentence has a limited
effect. The sentence authorizes the litigant to submit technical-
ly inadmissible information to the judge when the judge is
passing on an admissibility question. The sentence does not
even purport to authorize exposing the jury to such informa-
tion during the trial on the merits. If a litigant wants to pres-
ent technically inadmissible information about a validity study
to the jury to influence the jury's evaluation of the weight of
scientific testimony, the litigant cannot cite to Rule 104(a).
2. Compliance with the Hearsay and Character
Exclusionary Rules
Assuming that the litigant must satisfy the technical
exclusionary rules, there are two potential objections to the
admission of testimony about a validity study: the character
evidence prohibition and the hearsay rule.
a. The character evidence prohibition
The character evidence prohibition is codified in Federal
Rules of Evidence 404 and 405.' Rule 404(b) announces that
"[e]vidence of... acts [other than those alleged in the
pleadings] is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith." The
rule prohibits the proponent from introducing evidence of a
person's other acts to prove his or her character and, in turn,
using the person's character as circumstantial proof of con-
duct. 9 The thrust of the prohibition is that the proponent
cannot simplistically reason, "He did it once, therefore he did it
again."' Rule 405(a), however, lifts the character evidence
7' EDWARD J. IMWINKELEJD ET. AL. CALIFORNIA EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 4
(2d ed. 1994).
7 FED. M EvID. 404-05.
FED. Mt EvID. 404.
CARLSON, supra note 13, at 451-52.
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCr EVIDENCE §§ 1.03, 2:18
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ban when the person's character itself becomes "an essential
element" in dispute at trial." Suppose that when the propo-
nent attempts to present the jury with testimony about a va-
lidity study conducted by the testifying witness, the opponent
objects on character evidence grounds. The opponent argues
that the ultimate issue is whether the expert erred in perform-
ing the test conducted in the case and a prior validity study is
logically relevant only on a forbidden character-reasoning theo-
ry---'He was right (or wrong) before, therefore he was right (or
wrong) again."
At first blush, that objection might have some appeal. In
the final analysis, however, it is spurious. The character evi-
dence prohibition comes into play when a person's character is
used as circumstantial proof of the person's conduct on a par-
ticular occasion, usually an event such as an accident or crime
mentioned in the pleadings. When the proponent proffers a
validity study, however, the proponent is not offering the study
to prove the analyst's conduct on any occasion. Instead, the
focus is the validity of the scientific technique used by the
analyst. Even if the analyst dotted every i and crossed every t,
the test result might be inaccurate due to the inherent margin
of error in the technique; but in that event, the analyst's con-
duct is not the cause of the inaccuracy of the analyst's ultimate
conclusion.
The situation is akin to cases in which character itself is
an essential element. Validity testing is "not a simple pass-
fail"82 or "black and white proposition."' The validation pro-
cess has "a fundamentally mathematical dimension."' Valida-
tion is "probabilistic, rather than categorical. The experimental
process may disclose a margin of error reflecting the percent-
age of cases in which [even] a qualified, careful analyst [prop-
erly] employing the technique will reach an incorrect conclu-
sion."' Since validation is inherently probabilistic, the trier of
(1984).
81 FED. R. EVID. 405.
Black, et al., supra note 11, at 762.
Black, et al., supra note 11, at 785.
B.J. George, Jr., Statistical Problems Relating to Scientific Evidence in SCI-
ENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 105, 118 (Edward J. Imwinkelried ed., 2d ed.
1981).
' Imwinkelried, supra note 55, at 602.
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fact needs to know the probability that the technique will per-
form accurately. Ascertaining that probability is the whole
point of a validation study.
In this regard, the distinction between a validation and
proficiency study is akin to the difference between a negligent
manufacture action and a strict product liability case. In the
former, the question is whether, in the course of fabricating a
particular product, the defendant manufacturer was guilty of
negligence. When the plaintiff offers testimony about the
defendant's other negligently manufactured goods, the plaintiff
is using the other negligent acts to support an inference as to
the defendant's conduct on the occasion alleged in the com-
plaint. In effect, the plaintiff says, "The defendant did it before,
therefore he did it again--the paradigm of the reasoning for-
bidden by the character prohibition. Suppose, however, that
the plaintiff offers testimony about similar accidents involving
identically designed automobiles or heaters in a strict product
liability action. The character prohibition is arguably inappo-
site; in this setting,"the focus is on the qualities or properties
of a nonperson, usually some kind of physical object. Was a
steering wheel's design dangerously defective? To prove the
quality of the object, the plaintiff may attempt to introduce evi-
dence of other accidents involving the same or similar ob-
jects." 6 without running afoul of the spirit of the prohibition.
In sum, if the opponent raises a character evidence objection to
testimony about a validity study, the trial judge should over-
rule the objection.
b. The hearsay rule
Federal Rule of Evidence 802 announces a general rule
that hearsay is inadmissible "except as provided by these
rules."'7 Rule 801 supplies the definition of hearsay. At the
risk of oversimplification, the statutory definition includes as-
sertive statements and acts' which were made or performed
by out-of-court declarants89 and which are offered at trial to
' IMWINKELRIED, ET AL., supra note 76, at 200.
7 FED. P. EVM. 802.
eFED. P. EVID. 801(a).
" FED. Mt EvID. 801(b).
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prove the truth of the assertion."
Assume initially that the jurisdiction in question applies
the hearsay rule even to foundational testimony submitted to
the judge ruling on the admissibility of proffered scientific
evidence. In the face of the hearsay rule, could the judge con-
sider testimony about a validity study which the testifying
expert has not personally conducted?
In a Frye jurisdiction such as California, at the admissibil-
ity stage the proponent can arguably offer at least part of the
study for a nonhearsay purpose.9 One of the assumptions
underlying Frye is that even trial judges are incompetent to
pass directly on the question of scientific merit.92 If the judge
finds that the experts disagree sharply over the question of the
validity of a scientific theory or technique, the judge is not
supposed to determine which position is correct; under Frye,
the judge does not resolve the battle of the experts.93 When
the judge finds that there is a substantial controversy, the
judge must exclude the testimony; the mere existence of the
controversy precludes finding the general acceptance required
by Frye.94 In that light, the proponent can argue that the pas-
sages in the study reflecting the expert's acceptance of the
theory or technique are logically relevant for a nonhearsay
purpose.95 The mere fact that an expert says he or she sub-
scribes to the theory is some evidence of general acceptance,
just as their statement that they rejected the theory would be
some evidence of controversy.
The best analogy is to the operative fact or verbal act doctrine in
contract cases. It is well settled that the statements constituting an
offer and acceptance are admissible over a hearsay objection in a
contract action. Under the objective theory of mutual assent, it is
immaterial whether the defendant meant what he said when he ut-
tered the purported offer or acceptance. So long as the defendant's
external manifestation of intention matches the plaintiffs, there is a
contract.... There is a strong parallel between the Frye test and
90 FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
"' Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Science: Role of the Hearsay Doctrine in
Litigating Frye Challenges to the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 29 CRIm. L.
BULL. 158 (Mar.-Apr. 1993).
' Id. at 162-63.
Id. at 163.
94 Id.
" State v. Cary, 239 A.2d 680, 684 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968).
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the objective theory of mutual assent. [Ujnder the Frye test, the fact
that the experts' statements match or do not match is relevant even
if the statements are incorrect. If the experts say differing things
about the validity of the scientific theory or technique, the difference
tends to show a controversy that is the antithesis of general accep-
tanceo
Although this nonhearsay theory enjoys some support in
the case law,97 the theory has limited utility in the present
context. To begin with, this theory is unavailable in a Daubert
jurisdiction; in such a jurisdiction, general acceptance is no
longer in issue even at the admissibility hearing. Moreover,
even in a Frye jurisdiction, the logic of the theory applies only
to the passages in the validity study indicating whether or not
the expert accepts the theory being tested; the logic does not
extend to the passages summarizing the empirical research
and quantifying the margin of error. Finally, the theory can
operate legitimately only at the Frye hearing out of the jury's
presence. It is for the judge to decide admissibility under the
general acceptance standard; but once the judge rules in favor
of admitting the evidence, general acceptance is no longer in
issue-the only issue for the jury is the question of whether
the theory or technique is in fact valid. If at the trial on the
merits the litigant offers an assertive statement that the tech-
nique is valid to prove that the technique is valid in fact, the
statement is undeniably being used for a hearsay purpose.
In some jurisdictions, a second nonhearsay theory might
be tenable at the trial on the merits. Many jurisdictions permit
the cross-examiner to confront the expert with passages from
texts which appear to contradict the expert's position."3 These
courts permit questioning about contradictory passages at least
when the testifying expert consulted the text in the process of
forming his or her opinion." While this use of scientific texts
is widespread, this theory also has limited utility. The courts
sanctioning this practice uniformly state that the cross-examin-
er is permitted to resort to the contradictory text in order to
Imwinkelried, supra note 91, at 163.
Cary, 239 A.2d at 684.
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE MBIHODS OF ATrAcKING SCIENrlFIC EVI-




impeach the testifying expert's credibility.' 0 The passage in
the text is not admitted as substantive proof of the truth of the
assertions in the passage. California Evidence Code section 721
expressly authorizes cross-examiners to use this impeachment
technique, 0' but the official California Revision Commission
Comment to section 721 adds that "the court [is] required upon
request to caution the jury that the statements read are not to
be considered evidence of the truth of the propositions stat-
ed."0 2 Thus, the litigant cannot rely on this theory when he
or she wants to use passages in a text documenting a validity
study to establish that a particular scientific theory or tech-
nique is indeed valid. If the litigant wants to establish the
validity of the theory or technique, the litigant must ordinarily
turn to the learned-treatise hearsay exception.' That is the
only exception powerful enough to permit the litigant to bring
in passages in an out-of-court validity study as substantive
proof on the validity issue.0 4 That theory has constrained pa-
rameters, however.0 5
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18) represents one of the
more liberal versions of the learned-treatise exception.'
100 Id. at 95.
101 CAL. EVID. CODE § 721.
102 PARKER'S EVIDENCE CODE OF CALIFORNIA 88 (1985).
, The business-entry exception, codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), is
usually inapplicable. That exception comes into play when a business's employee
gains personal knowledge of a fact and, in the regular course of business, prepares
a record documenting that fact. With some exceptions, the person with first-hand
knowledge of the fact must be an employee of the business. See generally EDWARD
J. IMWINKELRIED, ELT. AL, COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1220 (2d ed. 1993).
On rare occasions, a validity study will fall within the ambit of this exception.
Suppose, for example, that the researcher is on the faculty of the University of
California and the University of California Press publishes the report detailing the
study. In most cases, the researcher with personal knowledge of the study has no
formal business relationship with the entity publishing the study. If the study ap-
pears in book form, the publisher might be a private commercial entity or the
press affiliated with another university. When the study appears in a technical
journal, the researcher typically has no formal agency relationship with the jour-
nal; the researcher simply submits an article documenting the validity study to
the journal, and the journal then decides whether to publish the article.
"' Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Comparativist Critique of the Interface Between
Hearsay and Expert Opinion in American Evidence Law, 33 B.C. L. REV. 1, 15
(1991).
100 Id. at 15-16.
100 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Learned Scientific Treatises Under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 803(18), 18 TRIAL 56 (Feb. 1982).
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Even that version is crabbed, however. By its terms, the rule
refers only to "treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets."" The
common denominator of those three terms is that they all
denote published, written material. It would strain that lan-
guage beyond the breaking point to extend the statute to justi-
fy a witness's reference to another expert's research which had
not yet been reduced to writing. Furthermore, the statute ex-
pressly states that the material must be "published."'" Argu-
ably, it would not even suffice if the article were in written
form but still "in press." Worse still, many states recognize a
version of the exception narrower than that set out in Rule
803(18). For example, some jurisdictions limit the scope of the
exception to passages in "authoritative" works." Some states
are even more restrictive; even if the work itself is a "stan-
dard" one,"' the specific passage in question must state a
fact "of general notoriety.""' As a practical matter, this re-
striction limits the exception to judicially noticeable facts."
The upshot is that while testimony about a validity study can
pass muster under the character evidence prohibition, in many
cases the testimony would be excludable as incompetent hear-
say. It is true that when litigators adduce testimony about va-
lidity studies, more often than not they overlook the hearsay
problem."3 However, if the opponent is acute enough to raise
a hearsay objection, and the trial judge applies hearsay doc-
trine rigorously, the judge frequently will be obliged to sustain
the objection.
M7 FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
1d. I.
W. Brown Morton, Jr., Recent Deuelopment Medical Treatce to be Admitted
as Direct Evidence in Wisconsim-Lewaadowski v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co.,
66 McH. L. REV. 183, 183 (1967).
Notes Learned Treatises, 46 IOWA L. REV. 463, 466 (1961).
m CAL. EVID. CODE § 1341.
1 1 BERNARD JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHEOOK § 18.7, at 435 (2d
ed. 1982); IMVINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 76 at 310; People v. Conrad, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 421, 430 n. 9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).




A. The Scientific Nature of a Proficiency Study
At trial, what is the logical relevance of a proficiency
study? As Part I explained, the scientist's trial testimony is
syllogistic in structure."' A validity study bears upon the
expert's major premise, that is, the assumption of the sound-
ness of the theory or technique upon which the expert relies. A
proficiency study relates to a different component of the
expert's reasoning process. After describing the theory or tech-
nique, the expert specifies the case-specific information to be
analyzed and then applies the theory or technique to evaluate
that information. At this juncture in the reasoning, the ques-
tion becomes how probable it is that the expert properly ap-
plied the theory or technique in evaluating the case-specific
information. The proficiency study bears on that probability.
The theory or technique may yield some inaccurate conclusions
even when the analyst correctly applies the technique. A valid-
ity study attempts to capture that built-in margin of error. A
proficiency study addresses a fundamentally different question,
namely, how often will the analyst apply the technique improp-
erly.
As we have seen, validity and proficiency studies not only
differ in their respective focal point, they also differ in several
other respects. In a validity study, the basic comparison is
between the results yielded by different scientific techniques.
The researcher compares results yielded by the technique be-
ing tested with the results generated by a technique that al-
ready has been validated. If the researcher is interested in
validating a new intoxication testing instrument, he or she
could compare its readouts with the results from direct blood
alcohol readings. Or if the researcher is investigating the valid-
ity of a new drug identification technique, he or she might
compare the findings yielded by that technique with a GC/MS
analysis. In a proficiency test, the researcher compares the
performance of laboratories using exactly the same scientific
technique.
"' See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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The Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Research Pro-
gram, conducted by the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration ("LEAA") during the 1970s, illustrates the point."'
Referee laboratories initially analyzed the samples and made
certain that they employed proper test procedures." 6 The re-
searchers not only instructed the crime laboratories being eval-
uated to use the same, standardized procedures as the referee
laboratories;" they also carefully monitored the manufacture
of the samples". to ensure that all the samples sent to the
participating laboratories were homogeneous." 9 The re-
searchers compared the findings by the referee laboratories
with the findings reported by the crime laboratories being
tested.' If the samples were homogeneous, the crime labora-
tories were directed to use the very same procedures as the
referees; if those laboratories reached different findings than
the referee laboratories, the difference would indicate that the
laboratories being tested were not properly following the proce-
dures."2 The thrust of this type of inquiry is assessing the
competency and performance of the individual laboratory,'
not an evaluation of the validity of the scientific technique
itself.
B. The Evidentiary Status of a Proficiency Study
Like the expert's major premise, the expert's application of
that premise to the case-specific information is an integral
element of the witness's reasoning process. The parties can
have occasion to proffer testimony about a study of the validity
of the theory or technique functioning as the major premise.
They might also have occasion to proffer testimony about a
study of the proficiency of the analyst or laboratory analyzing
the case-specific information. Part I demonstrated that at least
n, JOSEPH L. PETERSON ET AL., CRIME LABORATORY PRoFIcINcY TwwTING RE-
SEARCH PROGRAM (1978).
no Id. at 15, 22, 38.
1n7 Id. at 7.
nB I& at 28.
1 Id. at 26.
120 PETERSON ET AL, supra note 115, at 1.
121 Id. at 23.
2u Report of California Association of Crime Laboratory Directors Blind Trial
#2, March 29, 1990 (on file in Professor Imwinkehied's office).
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when the parties contemplate presenting the testimony to the
jury at the trial on the merits, they must comply with the
technical exclusionary rules of evidence. Can the parties intro-
duce such testimony over hearsay and character evidence ob-
jections?
1. Compliance with the Hearsay Rule
Unlike a validity study, a proficiency study ordinarily will
be admissible over a hearsay objection. Consider, for example,
a proficiency study conducted by a government agency such as
the LEAA's Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program."
The report summarizing the test results was prepared by
LEAA officials. The report sets out findings by a referee and
participating laboratories, compares the findings, and draws
conclusions as to the competency of the participating laborato-
ries. Upon a moment's reflection, it becomes clear that the
admissibility of the LEAA report is a classic problem of double
hearsay: the author of the report writes that employees of the
referee and participating laboratories made certain assertions
to the author. The first level of hearsay is the set of asser-
tions by the LEAA officials. '24 That level of hearsay falls
squarely within the official-record hearsay exception codified in
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8).1" In the words of that stat-
ute, the LEAA employees' assertions are "matters observed
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there
was a duty to report .... "126 Those employees are de jure
public officials, and they have firsthand, personal knowledge
that the referee and participating laboratories submitted cer-
tain findings to them.
Of course, there is a second level of hearsay: the seeming
assertions by the employees of the referee and participating
laboratories. The admission of the statements by the referee
laboratories can again be rationalized under the official-record
hearsay exception. The referee laboratories are performing a
task for the government agency conducting the proficiency test.
SPETERSON ET AL, supra note 115.
"'4 FED. R. EviD. 801(a).
'2r FED. R. EviD. 803(8).
126 Id.
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If the agency had the requisite in-house expertise, the agency
could have had its own employees perform the testing; but
lacking in-house expertise, the agency delegates the testing to
the employees of the referee laboratory. They are consequently
acting as de facto public officials, and the official-record hear-
say exception extends to statements by de facto as well as de
jure officials.'
Like the assertions by the referee laboratories, the state-
ments by the participating laboratories are admissible over a
hearsay objection, albeit on a different theory. Here the perti-
nent theory is that the statements are being used for a
nonhearsay purpose. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c), a
statement constitutes hearsay only if its proponent offers it to
prove the truth of the assertion contained in the statement."
In a proficiency study, the researcher is interested in the as-
sertive findings by the participating laboratory which are pre-
sumably false-the findings at odds with the findings by the
referee laboratory. Those findings indicate the extent of the
participating laboratory's incompetence or lack of proficiency.
The trier of fact is not being asked to assume that those find-
ings by the participating laboratory are true; quite to the con-
trary, the trier is invited to assume that those findings are
erroneous and then use those erroneous findings to evaluate
the participating laboratory's performance level.' Given that
gauge of the laboratory's capacity,' the trier can then make
a more informed decision as to whether the laboratory followed
proper test protocol in the instant case.
A similar analysis would obtain if the proficiency study
were conducted by a private, nongovernmental laboratory. As
in the case of a government proficiency test, there are two
levels of hearsay, but both levels either fall within a recognized
exception or are logically relevant on a nonhearsay theory.
13 1
In this context, though, the proponent of the proficiency study
would rely on the business-entry hearsay exception codified in
1" 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1633
(Chadbourn rev. 1974).
'8 FED. IL EVID. 801(a), (c).
I" PETERSON ET AL., supra note 115, at 23.
23 PETERSON ET AL., supra note 115, at 23.
'3 FED. R. EVm. 805.
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Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6).32 The first hearsay level is
the set of assertions by the employees of the private laboratory
conducting the proficiency test. Laboratories certainly qualify
as regularly conducted business entities.133 One of the activi-
ties commonly conducted by laboratories is proficiency testing.
If the laboratory's employees possess the necessary expertise,
they might personally conduct the referee testing.
Assume, though, the more difficult fact situation in which
an outside referee laboratory performs that function and both
the referee and participating laboratories submit their reports
to the employees of the laboratory supervising the proficiency
test. It is true that the laboratory's employees have personal
knowledge of the contents of the reports submitted to them by
the referee and participating laboratories. As in the case of the
official-records hearsay exception, however, the reported find-
ings by the referee and participating laboratories constitute a
second level of hearsay. Can the proponent of the proficiency
study surmount a hearsay objection aimed at that level, as he
or she can when relying on the official-record exception?
Again, the answer is yes. To begin with, the assertive
findings submitted by the referee laboratory will fall within
the business-entry exception. If the laboratory conducting the
proficiency test hires the referee laboratory, the latter laborato-
ry owes the former laboratory a business duty to properly
evaluate the samples. "It is unnecessary that the source of the
information be a direct employee of the business ....
Rather, the test is the existence of a business duty."3 So long
as the person furnishing the information to the business does
so pursuant to a business duty, the report is considered to
have been generated by the business. Because the referee labo-
ratory owes a business duty to the laboratory supervising the
proficiency test, the business-entry exception applies to the
employees of the referee laboratory. Their reports are therefore
admissible as substantive evidence that the reported findings
are correct.
32 FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
13 Edward J. Lnwinkelried, The Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative
Laboratory Reports Against Criminal Defendants, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 624-26
(1979) (collecting cases).
'" IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 103, § 1220 at 339.
" IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 103, § 1220 at 339.
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For their part, the participating laboratories' reports are
admissible as nonhearsay. The significant reports are those
that disagree with the referee laboratory's findings. The refer-
ee laboratory's findings are presumably correct; and to the
extent that the participating laboratory's findings disagree, the
disagreement reflects adversely on the competency or proficien-
cy of the participating laboratory. Its reports are most relevant
when they are false and erroneous. In short, the analysis is
analogous to the theory used to justify the admission of the
results of public-opinion polls.1" The laboratory is in the
business of conducting proficiency tests in the same sense that
a pollster is engaged in the business of conducting public-opin-
ion surveys; and in both cases, the reports submitted to the
business by outsiders-the laboratories being tested or the
citizens being polled-can be treated as admissible
nonhearsay.
2. Compliance with the Character Evidence
Prohibition
In the case of validity studies, use of the potential charac-
ter evidence objection is unsound. When we turn to proficiency
studies, however, that objection looms much larger. The ulti-
mate disposition of the objection turns on whether the proffer
of a proficiency study triggers the general rule forbidding char-
acter reasoning and, if so, whether the proffer falls within any
recognized exception to the general rule.
a. The proffer of a proficiency study as character evidence
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) announces a general rule
that a litigant may not proffer "[elvidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts" by a person "to prove the character of [the]
person in order [in turn] to show [the person's] action in con-
formity" with their character.' Does the proffer of a profi-
ciency study implicate that rule? That query raises three
subissues.
First, does a proficiency study amount to "[elvidence of
=" 1 MCCO MICK, EVIDENCE § 208, at 936-37 (4th ed. 1992).
"' FED. R. EVI. 404(b).
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other crimes, wrongs, or acts" within the meaning of that ex-
pression in Rule 404(b)? Two leading commentators have ar-
gued that as a matter of evidentiary policy, the scope of the
character evidence prohibition should be limited to "morally
tinged" conduct." 8 Proficiency studies document "perfor-
mance-type errors.""' Such errors, however, are hardly
crimes; and after all, "[t]o err is humanl.' 140 Does evidence of
such errors constitute proof of a "crime[], wrong[], or act U"?
That question must be answered in the affirmative.
The testimony constitutes "[e]vidence of [a] wrong." In
this context, an error can amount to an actionable civil wrong.
The courts routinely entertain tort actions based on errors in
laboratory analysis. For example, a test subject can maintain a
negligence action against a drug testing laboratory which erro-
neously reports to the subject's employer that the subject uses
illegal drugs.'4 ' Libel law points to the same conclusion. It is
not only libelous to assert that a businessperson is incompe-
tent; it is libelous per se, that is, actionable without proof of
special damage.'
Furthermore, as a matter of statutory construction, it is
difficult to embrace the argument that the character evidence
prohibition should be limited to "morally tinged" conduct.
4 1
As a matter of policy, it makes sense to confine the prohibition
to such conduct. One rationale for the prohibition is that the
routine admission of evidence of a person's bad character
would prejudice the trier of fact and tempt the trier to decide
the case against the person in order to punish them for past
misdeeds. 4 The risk of prejudice is minimal if the conduct in
question is neither criminal nor tortious. Yet, Rule 404(b) ex-
" Paul Rothstein, Intellectual Coherence in an Evidence Code, 28 LoY. LA. L.
REV. 1259, 1265 (1995). See also Richard Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand
the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777 (1981).
" Black, et al., supra note 11, at 775.
140 ALEXANDER POPE, PASTORAL POETRY AND AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM 297 (E.
Audra & Aubrey Williams eds., 1961).
11 Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 21 F.3d 1368 (5th Cir. 1994),
substituted opinion, No. Civ. A.H-91-2360 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 20463 (5th Cir.
1995); Stinson v. Physicians Immediate Care Ltd., 63 L.W. 2605 (III. App., Mar.
24, 1995).
14 WILLI3i L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 788-92 (5th ed. 1984).
"' See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
14 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 80, § 1:03.
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pressly refers to "crimes, wrongs, or acts" in the alterna-
tive.' It is a well-settled maxim of statutory interpretation
that courts should prefer a construction that gives effect to
every word in a statute.46 The courts eschew interpretations
that render a term inoperative 47 or superfluous.' Judicial
redaction of a statute is an extraordinary step.. which a
court should take only to avoid a truly absurd result or the
frustration of a clearly expressed legislative intent."W As a
matter of evidentiary policy, it would probably be defensible to
restrict the character evidence prohibition to testimony about
other crimes or civil wrongs. However, the question is not
simply one of common-law policy. Rather, the issue is a ques-
tion of statutory construction, and Congress chose to insert the
word "acts" in Rule 404(b) in addition to "crimes" and
"wrongs."
Since the proffer of a proficiency study does amount to
evidence of "wrongs, or acts," we must reach the second sub-
issue. That question is whether, in the words of Rule 404(b),
the evidence is being used "to prove the character of a per-
son."'5 Like "wrongs or acts," the term "person" poses a
definitional problem. Does "person!' apply only to natural per-
sons such as a particular laboratory technician, or does the
term extend to entities such as the laboratory itself?.
Any court would agree that the litigant is offering testimo-
ny about the conduct "of a person" if the litigant attempted to
* FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
In re Larsen, 59 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 1995); In re Andrews, 49 F.3d. 1404 (9th
Cir. 1995); Board of Tr. of Trucking Emp. Pension Fund v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495
(3d Cir. 1992); Herriman v. Conrail, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1148, 1154 (N.D. Ind.
1995); Brodheim v. Rowland, 783 F. Supp. 1245, 1250 n. 1 (NDl. Cal. 1991), affd
in part, vacated in part, 993 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Daniel M, II, 20
Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); ERLH, Inc. v. Saddlebach Valley Uni-
fied Sch. D., 272 Cal. Rptr. 529 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
State, 262 Cal. Rptr. 683 (Cal Ct. App. 1989).
11 Mail Order Ass'n of America v. U.S. Postal Service, 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
' Id.; sbida v. United States, 59 F.3d 1224, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re
Oxborrow, 913 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1990); Central Montana Elec. v. Adm'r of
Bonneville Power, 840 F.2cl 1472 (9th Cir. 1988).
"' Brodheim v. Rowland, 783 F. Supp. 1245, 1250 n. 1 (NJ). Cal. 1991), affd
in part, vacated in part, 993 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1993).





introduce evidence of a particular technician's errors on a prior
proficiency study to increase the probability that the same
technician erred in analyzing the samples in the instant case.
The more troublesome issue is whether the prohibition is ap-
plicable when the litigant proffers a proficiency study and it is
unclear whether the analyst who performed the test in the
case at bar participated in the proficiency study. It is unsettled
whether the term "person" includes entities such as incorporat-
ed laboratories. 15 2 In popular usage, we rarely allude to the
"character" of an entity.5 ' However, Rule 404(b) was modeled
after California Evidence Code section 1101, the governing
statute in the Simpson case."M Like Rule 404(b), section 1101
uses the term "person." In a separate section, however, the
California Evidence Code sets out a definition of "person;" and
that definition explicitly includes a "firm, association, organiza-
tion, partnership, business trust, corporation, limited liability
company, or public entity."155
In the present setting, it would be especially wrong-mind-
ed to refuse to include a laboratory within the protection of the
character evidence prohibition. As previously stated, it is clear
that the prohibition applies when the litigant proffers a partic-
ular analyst's prior errors to increase the probability that the
analyst erred again. If the prohibition applies and there is no
exception, the prohibition renders the evidence inadmissible.
Thus, the outcome is that the evidence would be barred even
though it tended to show the analyst's personal incompetence.
Contrast the outcome on the assumption that a laboratory
is not a "person" covered by Rule 404(b). On that assumption,
the prohibition is inapplicable; and the evidence is admissible.
The evidence would be admitted even though it has much less
probative value than evidence of the analyst's personal incom-
petence. When the evidence takes the form of the laboratory's
proficiency test, in the final analysis the evidence is admitted
to show incompetence by association; even though the
laboratory's analyst who conducted the test in this case might
not have participated in the laboratory's earlier proficiency
152 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5233, at 358 (1978).
M3 Id.
'' Id.
CAL. EVmD. CODE § 175.
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study, the study's results would be admitted to attack the
competence of his or her analysis in this case. Hence, excluding
a laboratory from the meaning of "person" leads to an absurd
result: the prohibition excludes highly probative evidence of a
particular analyst's personal incompetence but permits the
admission of evidence that is relevant only on an incompe-
tence-by-association theory.
If the litigant offered evidence of the analyst's personal
incompetence or the court opted to extend the prohibition to
entities such as laboratories, we would reach the third and last
subissue, namely, whether the evidence is being utilized "to
show [the person's] action in conformity" with character.' As
previously stated, the prohibition forbids litigants from using a
person's character as circumstantial proof of conduct.'
Can the litigant argue that this is one of the extraordinary
situations in which character itself is in issue? Federal Rule of
Evidence 405(b) lifts the bar of the character evidence rule in
the rare case "in which character or a trait of character of a
person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or de-
fense.""s That question must be answered in the negative.
When the proponent offers a proficiency study, the theory of
logical relevance is that the tendency to err, documented in the
study, increases the probability that the analyst erred in ana-
lyzing the sample relevant in the pending case; the evidence is
relevant to the issue of whether the analyst correctly applied
the scientific technique in the instant case. Assume that the
laboratory has misanalyzed other samples in other cases. Nev-
ertheless, the trier of fact should accept the laboratory's find-
ings if the trier concludes that the analyst followed proper test
protocol in the instant case.
This is not a case in which the pleadings or substantive
law place the laboratory's competence directly in issue. If a
newspaper published an article assailing the laboratory's profi-
ciency, the laboratory might sue for libel, 9 and the newspa-
per could defend on the ground that its report was true.10
Given those pleadings, the laboratory's competence itself would
11 FED. IL EvID. 404(b).
17 1 MCCORINCK, EVIDENCE § 188 at 792-93 (4th ed. 1992).
"' FED. R. EVID. 405(b).
" PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 142, at § 112.
iCo PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 142, at § 116.
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be one of the facts in issue. Federal Rule of Evidence 405
would come into play,'' and the trial judge could undoubted-
ly overrule a character evidence objection to the proffer of a
proficiency study.
This is the juncture in the analysis at which the distinc-
tion between proficiency and validity studies emerges most
starkly. Validation is an intrinsically probabilistic process; and
once the validity of a scientific technique comes into issue, the
trier needs to know the probability that the technique will
yield an inaccurate result even if the laboratory meticulously
complies with proper test procedure. When the trier is evaluat-
ing the validity of the scientific technique itself, the trier need
not draw any inference as to the analyst's conduct; to the ex-
tent of its invalidity, the technique can produce an erroneous
result even when the analyst's conduct is flawless.
The logical relevance of a proficiency study is fundamen-
tally different. When the proponent offers a proficiency study,
the proponent is attempting to show initially that the laborato-
ry is prone to error and ultimately that the laboratory once
again committed a "performance-type error0.""6 ' Beyond any
cavil, the proponent is inviting the trier of fact to draw the
intermediate inference that the analyst has a character trait,
disposition or propensity for such errors. This is quintessential
character reasoning. The character prohibition forecloses "once
a thief, always a thief" reasoning,'63 and in principle it should
preclude a litigant from arguing "once an incompetent, always
an incompetent."
b. The applicability of an exception to the
character evidence prohibition
If the proffer of a proficiency study would otherwise violate
the character prohibition, the proponent's only hope for defeat-
ing a character objection is convincing the judge that there is a
pertinent exception to the character ban. After announcing the
1I FED. R. EVID. 405.
162 Black, et al., supra note 11, at 775.
" Victor Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18
U.C.D. L. REV. 59, 68-69, 80 (1984).
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general character ban, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) recog-
nizes several exceptions to it.' The first two exceptions are
inapposite here; they relate to the character of a criminal ac-
cused or a named victim in certain types of criminal cases."
The third exception, though, is of interest. Rule 404(a)(3) codi-
fies that exception, allowing "[elvidence of the character of a
witness, as provided in rules 607, 608, and 609."" The pro-
ponent of a proficiency study might argue that this exception
justifies receipt of testimony about the study; the thrust of the
argument would be that this exception permits testimony
about character on a credibility theory of logical relevance and
that the study is relevant on that very theory.
Unfortunately, Federal Rule of Evidence 607 sheds little
light. That statute addresses the question of who may impeach
a witness, 67 but it says nothing about how a witness may be
impeached. Rules 608 and 609, however, provide insight into
the latter question. Rule 608(a) expressly authorizes the re-
ceipt of "[o]pinion and reputation evidence of character."'"
Significantly, though, Rule 608(a) specifies that "the evidence
may refer only to [the] character [trait] for truthfulness or
untruthfulness."'69  Rule 608(b) permits cross-examination
about certain types of specific acts even if they have not yet re-
sulted in a conviction.7 ' In an important respect, however,
Rule 608(b) parallels Rule 608(a); Rule 608(b) states that the
acts in question must be "probative of truthfulness or untruth-
fulness.""' Rule 609 governs when the impeaching evidence
takes the form of the witness's prior conviction for a crime. 2
Rule 609(a)(1) permits inquiry about felony convictions when
the judge concludes that the probative value of the conviction
evidence outweighs any attendant probative dangers. 3 Last-
ly, Rule 609(a)(2) sanctions "evidence that any witness has
FED. . EVID. 404.
166 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1)-(2).
169 FED. R EVID. 404(a)(3).
'7 FED. P. EvID. 607 ('The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling the witness.").
168 FED. P. EVlD. 608(a).
169Id,
10 FED. P. Evm. 608(b).
I" I&
172 FED. P, EVID. 609(a).
173 FED. P. EVID. 609(aXl).
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been convicted of a crime... involv[ing] dishonesty or false
statement."
74
These provisions share two common denominators. Admit-
tedly, one is that they authorize the receipt of testimony logi-
cally relevant to a witness's credibility rather than the histori-
cal merits of the case. The second common denominator is that
the provisions focus specifically on the character trait of un-
truthfulness. Rules 608(a) and 608(b) refer expressly to that
character trait.7 ' Rule 609(a)(2) uses even narrower lan-
guage, limiting its scope to offenses "involv[ing] dishonesty or
false statement."17' For that matter, in the final analysis,
even Rule 609(a)(1) targets that character trait. The theory of
logical relevance underlying felony impeachment under
609(a)(1) is that the conviction demonstrates the witness's
willingness to violate important social norms and that that
willingness increases the probability that the witness would
"again violate a[n important] social norm and testify untruth-
fully."1 7 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 609 explains
that the committee drafted 609(a)(1) on the assumption that a
"demonstrated instance of willingness to engage in conduct in
disregard of accepted patterns... translate[s] into willingness
to give false testimony."" Further, in striking the balance
between the conviction's probative worth and the incidental
probative dangers, the trial judge should give particular atten-
tion to the question of whether the nature of the felony bears
directly on the character trait of truthfulness. 7 1
In this light, it is misleading to suggest that Rule 405(a)(3)
broadly authorizes the receipt of character evidence relevant
on a credibility theory. Quite to the contrary, Rule 405(a)(3)
represents a narrow exception precisely targeting evidence
logically relevant to a witness's character trait of untruthful-
174 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
116 FED. R. EVID. 608.
"' FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). See IJ3WINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 103, § 708, at
192-93; Edward Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57
NEB. L. REV. 908, 918-19 (1978).
177 CARLSON, ET AL., supra note 12 at 396.
7$ Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Court and Magistrates, 46 F!R.D. 161, 297 (March 1969).
17 IMWINKELRIED ET AL, COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 708, at 194 (2d ed.
1993).
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ness. The ordinary meaning of "untruthfulness" is a disposition
to consciously lie.8 ' There are cases in which scientific wit-
nesses testify untruthfully, for example, by exaggerating cre-
dentials. 8 ' However, in most cases-particularly in the cases
identified in proficiency studies-the cause of the error is a
blunder pure and simple. The errors shown by proficiency
studies relate to a witness's character trait for competence, but
they do not pertain to the character trait for untruthful-
ness-the focal point of the limited exception codified in Rule
405(a)(3).
The drafters of the Federal Rules used the California Evi-
dence Code as one of their principal models." The result is
even clearer under that statutory scheme. For example, Evi-
dence Code section 786 proclaims: "Evidence of traits of his
character other than honesty or veracity, or their opposites, is
inadmissible to attack or support the credibility of a wit-
ness.""s Another provision, Evidence Code section 1104, ex-
pressly extends the character prohibition to "evidence of a trait
of a person's character with respect to care or skill. . ... ""
The California Law Revision Commission Comment to section
1104 asserts that by virtue of that provision, "character evi-
dence with respect to care or skill is inadmissible to prove that
conduct on a specific occasion was either careless... or un-
skilled.... ." The Comment makes it clear that the judge
has no discretion to admit evidence probative only of that prop-
osition; the Comment states flatly that section 1104 prescribes
"a fixed exclusionary rule."' Of course, as we have seen, a
proficiency study is logically relevant only on that theory; and
the plain statutory mandate is therefore that judges reject
proffered testimony about such studies.
U3 WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 953, 975 (1972).
Carol Henderson Garcia, Expert Witness Malpractice: A Solution to the Prob-
lem of the Negligent Expert Witness, 12 MisS. COLL. L. REV. 39, 49-52 (1991).
n2 For example, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rules 607 and 609 contain
several references to California authorities. Fed. B.. Evid. 607, 609 advisory
committee's notes.
n3 CAL EVID. CODE § 786.
Id, at § 1104.
PARKER'S EVIDENCE CODE OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 102, at 185.




It has been observed that evidence law should be struc-
tured to ensure that experts educate the trier of fact.'8 That
model certainly seems preferable to a system under which
experts merely express opinions ipse dixit and expect the trier
to uncritically defer to the opinion as a matter of course.'" If
the former model is preferable, it seems to follow as a corollary
that testimony about scientific validity and proficiency studies
should be admissible. If the jury is to decide independently
whether to conclude that a scientific technique is valid, the
jury needs to know the probability that the technique will yield
inaccurate results. Likewise, if the jury must determine wheth-
er a laboratory correctly applied a scientific technique, the jury
needs a sense of the laboratory staffs proficiency in using the
technique. On that issue, the most trustworthy evidence would
be a proficiency study investigating the staffs competency.
The case for admitting testimony about validity and profi-
ciency studies is compelling if we accept the widespread prem-
ise that, by and large, laypersons tend to overestimate the
probative value of scientific testimony. Many lower courts
subscribe to that premise."' In Daubert," the Supreme
Court approvingly quoted Judge Jack B. Weinstein's statement
that expert testimony can be "quite misleading because of the
difficulty in evaluating" its probative worth.'9' If that fear is
well-founded, it would seem imperative to ensure the admissi-
bility of validity and proficiency studies. Evidence that the
technique sometimes produces erroneous results would coun-
teract the risk that the jurors would assume that the scientific
technique is infallible.'92 Likewise, testimony about a profi-
1.7 Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts:
Deference or Education?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1131 (1993).
188 Id.
188 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
"0 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
191 Id. at 2798 (citing Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence Is Sound: It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1992).
11 Edward J. Imwinkelried & Robert G. Scofield, The Recognition of an
Accused's Constitutional Right to Introduce Expert Testimony Attacking the Weight
of Prosecution Science Evidence: The Antidote for the Supreme Court's Mistaken
Assumption in California v. Trombetta, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 59, 84 (1991).
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ciency study would be an effective antidote for the facile as-
sumption that a laboratory's staff has absolutely mastered the
protocol for using a technique.
As previously stated, in its 1992 report the N.R.C. simply
assumed that evidence law permits the introduction of testimo-
ny about proficiency studies.193 In the Simpson case, the tes-
timony was admitted without objection. Like Mr. Bumble, the
bench and litigation bar apparently cannot believe that evi-
dence law would be so asinine as to bar evidence of such sci-
entific studies. There are modern day Bumbles. In a 1983 deci-
sion, the Criminal Division of the English Court of Appeal
faced an evidentiary objection to testimony about a scientific
study conducted by the Home Office.' The court overruled
the objection. As one commentator remarked, it seemed patent
to the court "as a matter of common sense" that the study had
to be admitted. 95 In her words, "[a] legal system that
would... rule out such cogent evidence... [could not be]
defended."'96 As we have seen, though, if the exclusionary
rules of evidence are rigorously applied to testimony about
validity and proficiency studies, common sense might not pre-
vail; there are potentially successful hearsay objections to
evidence of validity studies, and the character evidence prohi-
bition might block the admission of evidence of a relevant
proficiency study. If we are to ensure the admission of these
seemingly necessary types of evidence, the hearsay and charac-
ter rules should be revised accordingly.
It is understandable that neither the bench nor the bar
has yet recognized the evidentiary hurdles to the introduction
of testimony about scientific research studies. Again, one of the
beauties of the old Frye regime was that under that evidentia-
ry standard, judges and litigators could "hid[e] from sci-
ence."97 The general-acceptance standard enabled judges and
litigators to "avoid coming to grips with science." '93 Daubert
has ushered in a new era in which the legal system no longer
has that luxury. Judges and litigators will need some time to
See supra note 49 and accompanying text
R. v. Abadom [1983] 1 All E!. 364 (C-).
D Jennifer A. James, A Clear Cut Case, 47 MNOD. L. REV. 103, 107 (1984).
"' Id, at 104.
"' Black et al., supra note 11, at 722.
rn Black et al., supra note 11, at 730.
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get their bearings; they need to become accustomed to working
with scientific studies. As Judge Alex Kozinski noted, judges
and litigators face the "daunting task"199 of evaluating scien-
tific research.. in the post-Daubert Brave New World."1
It was, of course, the 20th century English novelist, Aldous
Huxley, who first gave us a vision of Brave New World."°
Perhaps, though, the most telling remark was made by his
forebear, the famous 19th century biologist, Thomas Huxley.
The latter once wrote that "[tihe rung of a ladder was never
meant to rest upon, but only to hold a man's foot long enough
to enable him to put the other somewhat higher."0 3
Daubert was a step in the right direction, at long last
forcing the courts to confront directly the scientific standards
for determining the merit of expert testimony. 4 It is now
time for the next step-another step upward toward a more so-
phisticated appreciation of the critical scientific and evidentia-
ry differences between validity and proficiency studies.
" Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 189 (1995).
200 Id. at 1316.
201 Id. at 1315.
21 ALDOUS L. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).
213 THoMAS HUXLEY, ON MEDICAL EDUCATION, quoted in THE SHORTER
BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 185 (1959).
20. See Black et al., supra, note 35.
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